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Country-specific equity market characteristics and foreign equity portfolio 
allocation 
 
 
Abstract 
Do country-specific equity market characteristics explain variations in foreign equity 
portfolio allocation? We study this question using comprehensive foreign equity portfolio 
holdings data and different measures of country-specific equity market factors for 36 host 
countries. Employing panel data econometric estimations, our investigation shows that 
foreign investors prefer to invest more in larger and highly visible developed markets which 
are more liquid, exhibit a higher degree of market efficiency and have lower trading costs. 
The findings imply that by improving the preconditions necessary for well-functioning 
capital markets, policymakers should be able to attract higher levels of foreign equity 
portfolio investments.  
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis and its consequences continue to preoccupy policymakers. Capital 
markets around the world have been volatile, and governments are facing the difficult task of 
financing the investment needs of their local economy. There is a vast body of literature on 
the positive role of finance in economic development (Goldsmith, 1969; McKinnon, 1973; 
Fry, 1988; Levine, 1992). Among the different forms of finance, equity financing is an 
important source, and the role of foreign investors in funding the requirements of domestic 
economies has never been more vital. Errunza (2001) suggests that foreign equity portfolio 
investors have a significant positive impact on the development of local equity markets, 
which in turn should drive domestic economic development. Given the importance of foreign 
equity portfolio investment, it is imperative for policymakers to appreciate factors influencing 
the country allocation decision of foreign investors. This paper investigates whether the 
investment decisions of foreign investors are affected by the host country-specific equity 
market characteristics.  
 
The benefits of international diversification of portfolio investment are well established (see 
Grubel, 1968; Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Solnik, 1974a; Errunza, 1977, among others). The 
International Capital Asset Pricing (ICAPM) model suggests that international investors 
should hold the world market as the benchmark portfolio because it provides the best mean 
variance efficiency (Tesar and Werner, 1995; Solnik and McLeavy, 2004; Chan et al., 2005; 
Fidora et al., 2007). Studies also document the gradual removal of capital controls by 
developed countries beginning in the early 1980s (French and Poterba, 1991), and by 
developing countries by the late 1980s and early 1990s (Errunza, 2001; Harvey, 2003). 
However, despite increased access to financial markets across the globe, an extensive number 
of investigations demonstrate the prevalence of home bias, i.e., the tendency to overweight 
home markets relative to the theoretical prescription of the ICAPM (see Cooper and 
Kaplanis, 1994; Tesar and Werner, 1995; Warnock, 2001; Chan et al., 2005; Fidora et al., 
2007).  
 
The investigations on home bias document a number of potential barriers impeding foreign 
investors from holding the world market portfolio. These barriers may be direct legal 
restrictions due to different legal status accorded to foreign and domestic investors (Bekaert, 
1995), or indirect barriers arising from differences in available information and investor 
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protection (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; Errunza, 2001; Bekaert et al., 2003; Hunter, 2006). 
Similarly, market-specific risks, such as diversification opportunities, liquidity, transaction 
costs and level of host market efficiency, commonly known as stock market development 
factors, could also potentially impede foreign investment (Chan et al., 2005). However, to the 
best of our knowledge, no empirical study has specifically documented the role of country-
specific equity market factors on country allocation decisions of foreign investors, except 
Chan et al. (2005), who use different predetermined variables, including stock market 
development factors, to explain the issue of home and foreign bias. The persistence of home 
bias indicates that, on aggregate, foreign investors allocate a relatively large fraction of their 
wealth to domestic assets. This suggests that if we are able to control for home bias, we 
should be able to explain the role of different country-specific equity market characteristics in 
explaining bilateral cross-country foreign equity country allocation.   
 
Chan et al. (2005) note that a major factor limiting research on foreign equity portfolio 
investment is the lack of cross-border holdings data. We make use of the recently available 
IMF’s Co-ordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) foreign equity portfolio holding 
data
1
. Similarly, as Chan et al. (2005) state, most existing studies are from the perspective of 
U.S. investors, and they leave the question open of whether the explanations for a wide cross-
section of other source countries are similar or not. Furthermore, a very small number of 
existing studies, which use multiple source and host countries in their sample, only 
investigate the investments from developed countries into other developed countries. Since 
the U.S. and other developed countries’ equity markets exhibit higher levels of development 
relative to emerging markets, it remains to be tested whether the inclusion of the latter 
markets as host countries along with developed markets yields similar results.   
 
Our study makes three important contributions to the literature. First, we try to explain the 
role of country-specific equity market characteristics in explaining the cross-sectional and 
temporal variation of foreign equity country allocation. Apart from Gelos and Wei (2005), 
who use emerging markets only and focus on transparency measures, and Chan et al. (2005), 
who explain foreign bias, no study has undertaken comprehensive empirical investigation 
modelling cross-country allocations. Second, as noted earlier, despite the theoretical 
suggestions of the ICAPM, global investors do not hold the world market as their benchmark 
                                           
1
 Fidora et al., (2007) use the same dataset using the average over the period of 2001-2003 and demonstrate the 
role of exchange rate risk in explaining bilateral home bias. 
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portfolio. The ICAPM makes a number of assumptions, such as that global financial markets 
are perfectly integrated and fully efficient, investors incur no transaction costs, purchasing 
power parity perfectly holds and there are no barriers to international investments. Most of 
the earlier studies on international investments offer abstract theoretical explanations of why 
foreign investors may not hold the world market portfolio (see Solnik, 1974b; Black, 1974; 
Sercu, 1980; Stulz, 1981a,b; Adler and Dumas, 1983; Errunza and Losq, 1985; Eun and 
Janakiramanan, 1986; Cooper and Kaplanis, 1986, 1994). The majority of the equilibrium 
frameworks suggest that the violation of unrealistic ICAPM assumptions, which create 
costs/risks for global investors, should explain the under- or over-weighting of foreign 
countries relative to ICAPM’s weightings. However, empirical evidence modelling the 
violations of the underlying assumptions is scarce and limited by the unavailability of high 
quality data. We fill the gap by using different proxies of the underlying assumptions to 
model cross-country allocation. 
 
Finally, we pool bilateral data from 36 countries, developed and developing, spanning a 
period of nine years (2001-2009), with more than 500 cross-section units yielding 
approximately 4,600 observations. Such a comprehensive dataset with wide cross-sectional 
and temporal variation affords us the statistical confidence to test our hypotheses using panel 
data econometric estimations. Baltagi (1995) demonstrates that, compared to purely cross-
section data, panel data set-up supplies more information, more variability, less colllinearity, 
greater degrees of freedom and higher statistical efficiency, yielding reliable parameter 
estimates. Moreover, the application of fixed effect panel data model controls for individual 
heterogeneity; studies not controlling for unit-specific effects run the risk of producing biased 
estimates. Furthermore, and to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to demonstrate the 
impact of the 2007-08 global financial crisis on portfolio holdings, country allocations and 
parameter stability.
2
 
 
The findings show that country-specific equity market factors, particularly market size, 
liquidity (level of market efficiency) and transaction costs, are the key factors influencing the 
country allocation decisions of foreign equity portfolio investors. We demonstrate that 
country-specific equity market characteristics, predominantly stock market development 
factors, explain almost 54% of the total variation in foreign equity portfolio allocations. One 
                                           
2
 We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting that we include the impact of the 2007-08 financial crisis in 
our investigation. 
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of the key implications of our study is that by improving the preconditions necessary for a 
well-functioning capital market, policymakers should be able to attract higher levels of 
foreign equity portfolio investments.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the theoretical 
framework underlying our empirical analysis and provides a detailed discussion of the 
variables used. Section 3 reports and discusses empirical results and section 4 concludes the 
paper.  
 
2. Theoretical framework and data  
We follow the theoretical framework developed by Cooper and Kaplanis (1986). A simple 
prescription of their framework modelling portfolio allocation, based on ICAPM context, is 
as follows:  
 
 
 
where wijt is the weight (allocation) of foreign equity portfolio investors of country i invested 
in equities of country j for the time period t. For the same period,  is the benchmark 
weight, i.e. the proportion of the world market capitalisation accounted by country j’s equity 
market as prescribed by the ICAPM.  is the proportion of total world equity wealth owned 
by country i in the time period t.  is the deadweight cost to investors of country i for 
holding the equities in country j for the period t.  is the given level of variance of the 
equities’ return and h is the langrange multiplier of an objective function which maximises 
the equities’ returns for the given level of variance (for the objective function and detailed 
derivation, please see Cooper and Kaplanis, 1986). Clearly, if there are no costs, i.e.  is 
zero, all investors should hold is the . However, in the presence of deadweight costs, the 
above relationship shows that the greater the deadweight cost is ( ), the lower the 
allocation will be from investors of country i into country j relative to the suggestion of the 
ICAPM. In the following sections we first describe the proxy of foreign equity portfolio 
allocations (i.e. ), followed by the direct and indirect investment barriers that may 
potentially influence the country allocation decision of foreign investors (i.e. ). 
 
  (1)  
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2.1 Measure of bilateral foreign equity portfolio allocation 
The main dependent variable in all our regressions is the logarithmic value of portfolio 
allocations ( ) from country i into equities of country j, where portfolio allocations ( ) 
are defined as: 
 
 
Drawing on our theoretical framework (see equation 1),  is the weight of foreign equity 
investment from investors of country i into equities of country j for year t, and FPIijt is the 
actual foreign portfolio investment (stock of holdings) in USD millions. Our bilateral data on 
the 36 recipients or host countries (see Table 1 below) is from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  
 
The Co-ordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the IMF provides detailed and 
bilateral country-by-country foreign equity portfolio holding data. Most of the investments in 
the survey are from developed countries into other developed markets. The stock holding of 
developing countries is negligible. For this reason, we consider only developed countries as 
source countries.
3
 The number of investor or source countries is 16 (Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). Following other 
studies (see Chan et al., 2005 and Fidora et al., 2007), we too exclude offshore financial 
centres, such as Luxembourg, which are considered tax havens.  
 
Table 1 presents the sample averages of foreign portfolio equity allocation (in percentage) 
received by all the host countries j for the nine-year period 2001-2009. As seen from the 
second column, Peru received the lowest allocation (0.02%), whereas investors’ most 
favoured destination is the United States, with the highest allocation of 36.25%. The top ten 
                                           
3
 In terms of coverage of the survey, most of the financial market participants included in the survey are, but are 
not limited to, the primary end-investors (e.g. banks, security dealers, pension funds, insurance companies, 
mutual funds, non-financial corporations, households) and primary custodians who hold or manage securities on 
behalf of others. However, some caveats deserve due attention in using the data. Any investment below USD 
500,000 is not reported. In addition, some data, despite being available, may not be reported by a country for 
confidentiality reasons. 
 
  (2)  
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countries in terms of allocation are all developed markets (the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden, Japan, Italy, Germany, France, Finland and Canada), 
whereas nine of the bottom ten are developing countries (Argentina, Chile, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand and Poland). 
 
 
………......Insert Table 1 about here.............. 
 
 
2.2 Country-specific equity market proxies 
As our investigation underscores the importance of country-specific equity market 
characteristics, we first describe proxies of country-specific equity market factors, followed 
by the control variables. We use five different variables to capture key equity market 
features.
4
 The first variable (Stock market size) encapsulates the relative breadth (size) of the 
equity market, reflecting the significance of the capital market in the economy. Levine and 
Zervos (1996) claim that developed markets, which are bigger in size, are better at mobilising 
capital and diversifying risk. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Chan et al. (2005) suggest that 
foreign investors tend to allocate more wealth to bigger and developed markets. Similarly, 
Chan et al. (2005) conjecture that bigger stock markets are more visible, more recognised and 
more developed, and therefore are able to attract more foreign equity portfolio investment. 
Following Levine and Zervos (1996) and Chan et al. (2005), we add the logarithmic ratio of 
stock market capitalisation to GDP as a measure of stock market size. This variable is 
sourced from the World Development Indicator (WDI) of the World Bank. Table 1 (column 
3) shows that the top ten countries ranking against this measure are all developed markets, 
with the exception of Chile, Malaysia and Taiwan. Similarly, the bottom ten countries 
generally represent emerging markets, with the exception of Austria, Italy, New Zealand and 
Portugal. The regression coefficient on this variable should carry a positive sign. 
 
The next two variables we use are the proxies that capture relative development of the market 
microstructure. In a relatively more developed market, transaction costs would be lower. 
Solnik and McLeavey (2004) argue that the effect of transaction costs is often neglected in 
international portfolio management. They claim that the impact of transaction costs should be 
                                           
4
 We also consider number of listed companies scaled by total population and trade volume scaled by GDP as 
alternative measures. However, because these measures are highly correlated with stock market development 
and turnover ratio, we do not include them since they do not add any additional information. However, when 
regressed individually both these measures are highly significant in all our regressions. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
8 
 
integrated in active global portfolio management, as these vary significantly amongst 
different countries. Higher transaction costs may reduce the expected return and diminish the 
benefits of global diversification; therefore, the effect of transaction costs should be a key 
consideration, particularly when investing in emerging markets. Keim and Madhavan (1995), 
who highlight the importance of transaction costs in determining investment performance, 
also suggest that transaction costs may materially lower the expected value of an investment 
strategy which otherwise may appear lucrative. Similarly, Rowland (1999) shows the inverse 
relationship between higher transaction costs and benefits of international portfolio 
diversification. Furthermore, De Roon et al. (2001) demonstrate that for U.S. investors 
investing in emerging markets, the diversification benefits become smaller when short selling 
and transaction costs constraints are incorporated. Similarly, studies investigating the 
association between transaction costs and asset pricing generally conjecture that equities with 
higher transaction costs trade at lower prices compared to their expected cash flows (see 
Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Datar et al., 1998).  
 
The available empirical findings imply that despite the inherent diversification benefit, 
foreign investors may prefer to underweight countries that have higher transaction costs. We 
use a composite estimate of country-level transaction costs associated with trading 
international securities. The transaction costs variable is estimated and maintained by Elkins-
Sherry (E/S) and documented in the yearly Global Stock Market Factbook of Standard and 
Poor (S&P). E/S provides transaction costs analysis for global institutional investors, such as 
pension funds, investment managers and other investment companies. The estimates of total 
trading costs comprise three sub-components. The first is the average commission; the second 
is the average fee. It is worth noting that for the UK, the buying fee is significantly higher 
because of stamp duty. We have taken the average of the buy and sell figures, as investors 
pay more for buying but are compensated significantly less for selling. The third component 
is the average cost of market impact. Market impact is the difference between the price at 
which a trade is executed and the average of the stock’s high, low, opening and closing prices 
during the trading period. More specifically, it is the average cost of trade versus the average 
price. Solnik and McLeavy (2004) define market impact as the difference between the actual 
execution cost and the price that would have prevailed in a case of no-trade by the manager. 
We aggregate all three components of transaction costs to form a composite measure 
denominated in basis points. As presented in Table 1 (column 4) the ten markets with the 
highest transaction costs are all emerging markets, with the exception of Greece. The 
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Philippines has the highest transaction costs, with 88 basis points (bps) per average 
transaction. Similarly, the ten countries with the lowest transaction costs are all developed 
markets, with Japan having the lowest average cost of 19 bps, followed by the U.S., with 22 
bps. In our regression, we expect this variable to bear a negative sign, since higher transaction 
costs would be associated with lower equity portfolio allocations. 
 
Following Bekeart and Harvey (2000), the other microstructure variable we use captures the 
liquidity of the market. As noted earlier, studies show assets with lower liquidity trade at a 
lower price relative to their expected cash flows (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1996; Datar et al., 1998). This suggests that illiquid assets demand an extra 
risk premium and therefore should have higher expected returns, which further implies that 
foreign investors should underweight countries with illiquid markets. Bekeart et al. (2007) 
claim that the effect of liquidity is more pronounced in emerging markets, where it takes 
considerable time to execute transactions. Following Levine and Zervos (1996), we use the 
turnover ratio (Market liquidity) as proxy of market liquidity. Bekaert and Hodrick (2008) 
further suggest that although turnover ratio is often regarded as an indicator of liquidity, it 
can also reflect the arrival of news that instigates trades and hence is also an indirect measure 
of market efficiency. Damodaran (2010) remarks that one of the minimum requirements for a 
market to be efficient, with prices therefore the best estimates of true values, is that trading 
should be inexpensive, instantaneous and easy. This conjecture again implies that liquidity 
measures may also reflect the degree of market efficiency. Solnik and McLeavey (2004) also 
support the claim the markets with a higher degree of price efficiency are associated with a 
higher degree of liquidity. 
 
Furthermore, turnover also complements the stock market development/size measure, given 
the argument that a large market may not be the most active market. For example, the value 
of stocks traded in anada for the year 2006 is USD 1,290,246 million (market capitalisation 
of USD 1,700,708 million) with a turnover ratio of 81%. For the same year, the value traded 
in Sweden was almost half of that in Canada, i.e. USD 677,122 million (market capitalisation 
of USD 573,250 million), but the turnover ratio was 139%. We incorporate the average value 
traded as a percentage of mean market capitalisation sourced from different issues of Global 
Stock Market Factbook of S&P. As seen from Table 1 (column 5), the majority of the 
countries with the highest turnover ratio are developed markets, with the exception of India, 
Taiwan and Korea. The regression coefficient is expected to take on a positive sign. 
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We further add two variables to reflect potential market volatility. The first variable we 
include is the three-year moving standard deviation (Local equity market volatility) of host 
country’s stock market returns, constructed using the previous 60 months’ total return index 
denominated in local currency.
5
 We obtain the monthly total return index from Morgan 
Stanley Capital Investment (MSCI). Following the conceptual framework of Cooper and 
Kaplanis (1986), variance negatively affects returns, suggesting foreign investors may avoid 
countries with a certain level of volatility. As shown in column 6 of Table 1, except for 
Belgium most of the ten countries with the highest stock market volatility are emerging 
markets, indicating greater future uncertainty (risk) relative to developed markets. As such, 
investors may shy away or underweight markets with higher stock market volatility. The 
regression coefficient of this variable should carry a negative sign. 
 
Solnik and McLeavy (2004) remark that in addition to the premium demanded due to local 
market volatility, currency risk premium must be earned by foreign investors for bearing 
systematic exchange rate risk which cannot be diversified away. They claim that despite 
diversification, the world market portfolio is sensitive to foreign exchange rate risk, and 
therefore the latter needs to be taken into consideration in international portfolio 
management. Such arguments conjecture that exchange rate movements should also affect 
investors’ decisions (see Solnik and McLeavey, 2004). Following the risk-return relationship 
argument of the ICAPM, investors should underweight countries with higher movements in 
real exchange rate. This may be particularly important when investing in emerging markets, 
which experience wide swings in foreign exchange rates. As the second measure of earnings 
volatility relevant to foreign investors, we use the three-year moving average standard 
deviation (Exchange rate volatility) based on monthly figures of trade weighted real effective 
exchange rate (REER) variable obtained from the Bank of International Settlement (BIS). 
The trade weighted effective exchange rate is a better indicator of the macroeconomic effects 
of exchange rates than purely a single bilateral rate (see Mark and Fung, 2006). The REER 
used in this study is the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) adjusted by relative 
consumer prices levels. The NEER is calculated as the geometric weighted average of a 
basket of bilateral exchange rates, which implies that variation in the REER incorporates both 
                                           
5
 The use of local currency is dictated by theoretical consideration. Unlike local investors, foreign investors are exposed to 
two different types of volatility risks. The first is the risk arising from volatility in host country’s equity return, which is 
borne by local and foreign investors. The second, which is only of concern to foreign investors, arises from the movement in 
the currency exchange rate. For further details, please see Solnik and McLeavey (2004). We thank the anonymous referee for 
clarifying this issue. 
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developments in nominal exchange rate and the inflation differential vis-à-vis trading 
partners. Carrieri et al. (2006) note that the use of REER should be preferred to NEER 
because inflation rates are generally non-random and hence nominal exchange rate may not 
reflect the true effect of exchange rate risk. They note that because REER is measured taking 
account of the combined effect of changes in the inflation differential and changes in nominal 
currency value, it is a better proxy as it captures the true effect of exchange rate risk arising 
from the deviation of PPP. The BIS REER basket used in this study incorporates 52 
economies, including emerging markets. For further details, please refer to Mark and Fung 
(2006) and Carrieri et al. (2006). The summary average for all countries over the six-year 
period is reported in Table 1 (column 7). The ten markets with the highest real exchange rate 
volatility are generally found in emerging countries, with the exception of Australia, Japan 
and New Zealand. Turkey reveals the highest exchange rate volatility. On the other hand, 
nine of the ten countries with the lowest exchange rate volatility are developed markets. In 
our sample, Austria exhibits the lowest real exchange rate volatility, with 1.8% standard 
deviation. We expect this variable to yield a negative regression coefficient. 
 
2.2 Control variables 
The first issue to control is the widely studied home bias phenomenon. It is evident from the 
literature (see French and Poterba, 1991; Tesar and Werner, 1995; Warnock, 2001; Karlsson 
and Norden, 2007; Chan et al., 2005; Fidora et al., 2007) that investors tend to significantly 
overweight their home market and therefore actual portfolios deviate from the theoretically 
derived world market portfolio. Chan et al. (2005) note that if foreign investors overweight 
their local market, then the rest of their allocation should also be disproportionately lower. 
Consequently, home bias could be an important explanatory variable for explaining foreign 
allocation. As investors deviate from holding the world market portfolio, following Fidora et 
al. (2007) we construct the following bilateral home bias (Hbiasijt) to control for the impact of 
home bias on foreign equity allocation: 
 
 
where Hbiasijt is bilateral home bias observed by investor country i for country j at time t.  
BWTijt is defined as the benchmark weight and is computed as:  
 
  (3)  
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where MCjt is the market capitalisation of the recipient or host country j at time t.  
 
As seen from column 2 of Table 2 below, all investor countries exhibit significant home bias. 
Among the top ten countries ranking highest on the scale of Home bias, eight are developing 
countries (Argentina, Chile, China, India, Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines and Taiwan) and 
two are developed countries (Canada and New Zealand). This shows that investors manifest 
home bias not only towards developing countries but also towards developed countries, 
suggesting a strong rationale for controlling the impact of the domestic bias on foreign 
portfolio allocation. Following the evidence on home bias, this variable should yield a 
negative regression coefficient.  
 
 
………......Insert Table 2 about here.............. 
 
 
We include the logarithmic value of the GDP per capita income and GDP growth figure for 
each country to control for the level of economic development and economic growth. Both 
these variables are obtained from the World Development Indicator. We also control for any 
capital control measure that a country might have imposed on inward foreign portfolio 
investment. As a proxy for the degree of financial liberalisation we use the capital control 
intensity measure (Equity market openness) suggested by Edison and Warnok (2003). The 
latter measure is constructed by taking the ratio of market capitalisation represented by 
S&P/IFC investable indices (correcting for foreign ownership) to the market capitalisation 
denominated by S&P/IFC global indices. This variable ranges from zero to one, with one 
implying total domestic market capitalisation freely open to foreign investors, and zero 
implying a completely closed market. Since these indices are mostly available for developing 
countries in the S&P’s Global Stock Market Factbook, they have been set to one for all 
developed countries. For more details see Edison and Warnok (2003) and various issues of 
S&P Global Stock Market Factbook. The Equity market openness variable is a time varying 
proxy and therefore captures the time variation in the financial liberalisation process (see De 
Jong et al., 2005). The regression coefficient on this variable is expected to carry a positive 
sign. Our equity market openness measure is based on the assumption that all the developed 
  (4)  
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markets’ stocks are fully free floated, which may not be the case. Dahlquist et al. (2003) note 
that only a small portion of the market capitalisation in most countries is available to 
international investors who are not controlling shareholders. They compute the percentage of 
firms closely held for many countries. We employ the variable (Closely held firms) of 
Dahlquist et al. (2003) as the percentage of closely held shares of market capitalisation to 
complement the Equity market openness measure. As Dahlquist et al. (2003) imply, the 
Closely held firms variable is expected to capture the prevalence of ownership restrictions, 
particularly in countries with poor investor protection rights, and is expected to have a 
negative regression coefficient. 
 
We also control for the bilateral familiarity or information asymmetry variables. It is highly 
likely that bilateral investments may be influenced by long-term bilateral relationship, 
geographic proximity and market familiarity. We employ a language dummy (Common 
language dummy), which takes the value of one if a pair of countries shares a common 
language. Countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and 
India share a common language (i.e. English). Similarly, we also include the distance (Log 
distance) between the capital cities of the pair countries. On average, European countries are 
closer to each other, with Australia and New Zealand being the furthest. Both variables are 
obtained from www.nber.org/~wei/data.html and used by Subramanian and Wei (2007). 
Further, Chan et al. (2005) suggest that investors are more confident in holding stocks of 
foreign companies whose goods and services are well-known to them. Hence, we include the 
bilateral trade (Log bilateral trade) obtained from the Bilateral Trade Statistics database of 
the IMF. It is constructed by adding the logarithmic value of the paired country’s total export 
and import values. Countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany 
share the highest average bilateral trade. Most of the emerging countries score lower on this 
measure. All the bilateral familiarity measures used in our study predict the probability of 
bilateral information flow and measure the barriers that foreign investors may encounter 
when seeking information overseas. It is worth noting that the three bilateral familiarity 
variables and Equity market openness measure are orthogonalised with the free floated home 
bias measure (see Section 3.3), as a number of studies show that the latter factors explain 
home bias to a significant extent (see Chan et al., 2005; Fidora et al., 2007).
6
 This does not 
                                           
6
 In fact, a simple regression of the three bilateral familiarity variables and Equity market openness measure 
explains almost 26% of the variation in home bias, and all four independent variables are statistically 
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affect the competitiveness of the home bias variable, three bilateral familiarity variables and 
the Equity market openness measure with any of our key variables of interest. 
 
We also add a three-year moving average return (Historical return) to capture the prevalence 
of return chasing or feedback behaviour (see Bohn and Tesar, 1996; Froot et al., 2001; 
Richards, 2005; Bekaert et al., 2002; Dahlquist and Robertson, 2004; Griffin et al., 2004). 
Following the return chasing hypothesis, we expect the regression coefficient on this variable 
to bear a positive sign. 
 
Aggarwal et al. (2005) demonstrate that U.S. funds tend to invest in open markets exhibiting 
stronger shareholder rights and legal frameworks. However, in sharp contrast, Chan et al. 
(2005) claim that investor protection does not influence the decisions of foreign investors. 
We add a composite measure of investor protection sourced from the World Bank 
Governance Indicator. This variable is composed of two broader aspects of regulatory 
environment. The first is the regulatory quality based on a scale of 1-100, capturing the 
perceptions of local government’s ability to formulate and implement sound policies effective 
for private sector development. The second, which is also measured on a scale of 0-100, is 
the rule of law. The latter captures the perception of the extent to which agents show 
confidence in and follow the rules of society, especially the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police and the courts. Both these variables are aggregated and scaled by 
0.5 to yield a rating of 0-100. A higher rating denotes greater investor protection rights and 
therefore greater propensity of foreign investment. The regression coefficient on this variable 
should carry a positive sign, following the claim in existing literature that investors prefer 
countries having better investor protection measures in place. Following La Porta (1998), it is 
shown that the English common law system provides better legal protection rights to 
shareholders than the German and French civil law system. We generate a dummy (English 
common law dummy) which takes the value of one for common law countries and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Finally, since our time series period includes the 2007-08 financial crisis, we control for the 
time effect and the impact of the 2007-2008 financial crisis using three time dummies. The 
first is Pre-crisis time dummy_2002_2006 for the years 2002-2006 (2001 is the base dummy), 
                                                                                                                                   
significant. Due to space constraints we do not report the results but they can be obtained from the authors on 
request. 
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the second is the Crisis-period time dummy_2007_2008 for the peak of the crisis period 
2007-2008 and the third is the Post-crisis time dummy_2009 for the year 2009, when global 
financial markets began to stabilise. 
 
The summary statistics of all control variables are shown in Table 2. As expected, all the 
variables show that emerging markets have lower economic development, although higher 
economic growth. Developed markets score higher on the investor protection measure and, 
following the financial liberalisation measures, developed markets are more open and firms’ 
ownerships are less closely held relative to emerging markets. 
 
3. Results of regression analysis 
Do foreign investors allocate a greater share of their wealth to relatively more developed 
equity markets? Our univariate analysis, as shown in Table 1 and discussed earlier, does 
indicate so. To further substantiate our initial findings we run a number of regressions 
addressing several robustness issues (bias and efficiency). In contrast to the preferred fixed 
effect model, the use of the random effect estimations for the majority of our regressions is 
dictated by the inclusion of time invariant factors, such as the English common law dummy, 
Common language and Distance. Before reporting the results, it is worth noting the caveat of 
using the panel data model. In pooling the data the estimated values of the slope coefficients 
are assumed to be identical across countries, i.e., βj=β. If this assumption holds, then this will 
lead to a more precise estimate. However, given our dataset of cross-countries, homogenous 
parameter is a very strong assumption and is apparent that the slope coefficients are not 
identical.
7 
Hence, in our estimations each of our pooled estimators represents an average 
slope coefficient allowing us to comment on the average predictive relationship between the 
variables. However, we demonstrate the issue of parameter heterogeneity, across countries 
and time, in one of our regressions in section 3.6 below. 
 
We first discuss the results of our key variables of interest and reserve examination of the 
control variables until the end of this section. Given that our data is at country level and 
matched pairs, it is fair to assume that the “clustered errors” i.e. the observations within 
groups (ij), may be correlated, inducing correlation in the error term. To address the issue of 
clustering, i.e. the key source of heteroskedasticity, we use the robust variance matrix 
                                           
7
 A similar assumption is made for parameter heterogeneity over time. 
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estimator for correcting the standard errors for the within correlation among the units in each 
of the clusters. Wooldridge (2002) notes the resulting variance matrix, which is corrected for 
clustering, is robust to any kind of intra-cluster correlation and arbitrary heteroskedasticity, 
provided N(cross-section units) is large relative to the number of units in each cluster. In our 
case N is over 500 and the number of units within any cluster is a maximum of nine years of 
country allocation. In almost all our random effect GLS estimations, we correct the standard 
errors using the cluster robust variance matrix (see equation 7.26 of Wooldridge (2002), page 
152 and page 330), which not only produces efficient cluster robust standard errors, but also 
the unrestricted Ω matrix of the robust variance matrix estimator allows for arbitrary serial 
correlation. For reference and technical details on the correction, please see Wooldridge 
(2002), pages 329-330. 
 
3.1 Basic regression 
As multi-collinearity is not a major problem (see Table 3 below) for our country-specific 
equity market characteristic ( ) measures, we include all five variables in the 
following specification (5), without the controls.  
 
 
………......Insert Table 3 about here.............. 
 
The results are presented in Table 4. Column 2 shows that except for the Exchange rate 
volatility measure, all other  variables are highly statistically significant with correct 
predicted signs. Except for the Local equity market volatility, which is statistically significant 
only at 10% significance level, Stock market size, Transaction costs and Market liquidity are 
significant even at 1% significance level. The overall R
2
 of the above specification shows that 
 accounts for 54% of cross-sectional and temporal variation in the foreign equity 
portfolio allocation. The outcomes suggest that  are the influential factors in foreign 
investors’ country allocation decision.  
 
………......Insert Table 4 about here.............. 
 
The statistical significance of the Stock market size variable, with an estimate of 0.51, is in 
line with previous studies validating the claim that investors prefer to invest in relatively 
bigger markets. Consistent with the suggestions of existing studies (see Chan et al., 2005), the 
  (5)  
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results confirm that because larger stock markets are more visible, more recognised and more 
developed, they are better at attracting higher levels of foreign equity portfolio investments. 
The predicted signs of the coefficients and the statistical significance of two micro-structural 
variables, Transaction costs and Market liquidity, support the claim that foreign investors 
prefer to invest more of their wealth in more cost effective, more efficient and more liquid 
markets. The coefficient of -0.46 on transaction costs implies that investors favour markets 
with lower transaction costs. Similarly, a higher level of market liquidity with a positive 
coefficient of 0.33 clearly supports the conjecture that foreign investors are more inclined to 
overweight their portfolio in relatively more liquid markets, which also reflect a higher 
degree of market efficiency. The estimate of Local equity market volatility is also significant, 
with an expected negative sign. The coefficient of -0.11 and test statistic of -1.84 provide 
indication that investors tend to avoid more volatile markets, as higher volatility implies 
higher risk of investment. The effect of higher volatility is more significant in smaller 
emerging markets that offer lower levels of industrial diversification for mitigating firm-
specific risks. The Exchange rate volatility variable, reflecting the foreign exchange risk, is 
not statistically significant but bears the expected sign. Again, these findings are consistent 
with our analysis of summary statistics supporting the evidence that markets which are 
relatively bigger in size, more liquid and more cost effective are the major recipients of 
foreign equity investments.  
 
Although most of our variables are statistically significant, they may be biased and the test 
statistics inefficient in the absence of other control variables, or they may be plagued by 
endogeniety problems. To ensure the robustness of our results we undertake a number of 
additional regressions and tackle concerns that could challenge the rigour of our findings. 
 
3.2 Omitted variable bias and cross-sectional dependence 
The estimates of specification (5) may be biased in the absence of other factors, particularly if 
they are correlated with . Similarly, as we have used 36 countries with a six-year 
time dimension, there could be significant country-specific and time effects. To mitigate the 
omitted variable bias, we undertake two additional regressions. First, we run specification (6) 
including  and Home bias ( ) variables. We report the results in Table 4 
(column 3). 
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As expected, the inclusion of the home bias measure significantly increases the adequacy of 
the model. The overall R
2
 rises to 67% and the Home bias coefficient carries the expected 
sign and is statistically significant. This statistical significance of Home bias confirms the 
claim that foreign investors still prefer their home markets relative to the mean-variance 
prescription. All the coefficients of  are still statistically significant, even at 1% 
significance level, and bear expected signs. In contrast to the previous regression, the 
Exchange rate volatility measure is now statistically significant and the negative sign 
signifies that investors tend to invest less in countries experiencing higher movement in their 
exchange rates. The size of all coefficients does change, which is understandable, as the 
addition of Home bias factor mitigates omitted variable bias to a considerable extent and 
further improves the efficiency of test statistics. 
 
We further add all other observed control variables and the time dummies in specification (7) 
below and report the results in Table 4 (column 4).  
 
 
 
 
As expected, the magnitudes of the estimates do alter, but the adequacy of the model further 
improves, as indicated by the R
2
 of 79%. Although the size of the estimates changes, the 
coefficients of all our key variables, except the local volatility measure, are still statistically 
significant at the conventional significance level of 5%, except for Local equity market 
volatility, which is significant only at 10% significance level.  
 
One of the key reasons for employing a panel data framework is to allow for the unobserved 
time invariant unit-specific effects which, if correlated with any of the regressors, may 
potentially produce biased estimates. Although we have been able to control for most of the 
time varying and observed time invariant variables, unit-specific effects may also bias our 
estimates significantly from their true values. Examples of such effect could be special 
treaties between pair countries, favoured country, cultural ties and common colonial history. 
We address the issue of unobserved individual heterogeneity by running specification (8), 
  (6)  
  (7)  
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which is similar to specification (7), but here we use fixed effect estimation instead of 
random effect estimation.  
 
 
Furthermore, we also correct the standard errors of fixed effect estimation for 
heteroskedasticity that may arise from cross-sectional dependency using the Driscoll and 
Kraay (1998) standard errors for coefficients estimated. These standard errors are robust to 
general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence. Because this nonparametric 
technique of estimating standard errors places no restrictions on the limiting behaviour of the 
number of panels, the size of the cross-sectional dimension does not constitute a constraint on 
feasibility even if the number of panels is much larger than T. For further technical details of 
the correction, please see Driscoll and Kraay (1998). However, it is worth noting that we can 
only apply the fixed effect model at the cost of excluding any time invariant variables. 
Furthermore, although the coeffiicents of fixed effect estimations are relatively more 
unbiased, they may not be the most efficient compared to random effect estimation because 
the former only uses the within variations in the dataset (see Wooldridge, 2002 for technical 
details). 
 
 
As shown in Table 4 (column 5), all our  measures, except the local equity market 
volatility factor, are still statistically significant. This further substantiates that even after 
including all the observed and unobserved covariates, and controlling for cross-sectional 
dependency, the three measures of , i.e. size, trading cost and liquidity, have a 
strong influence on investors’ country allocation decision. 
 
3.3 Home bias and free investability 
It is evident from the literature (see French and Poterba, 1991; Tesar and Werner, 1995; 
Warnock, 2001; Karlsson and Norden, 2007; Chan et al., 2005; Fidora et al., 2007) that 
investors tend to significantly overweight their home market and therefore actual portfolios 
deviate from the theoretically derived world market portfolio. Chan et al. (2005) note that if 
foreign investors overweight their local market, then the rest of their allocation should also be 
disproportionately lower. Consequently, Home bias could be an important explanatory 
variable for explaining foreign allocation.  
  (8)  
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However, home bias may itself be created by investment restrictions imposed by host 
countries, whereby the entire market capitalisation for a given country may not be freely 
available for investment to foreign investors. This may be particularly true for emerging 
markets. In order to address this issue we include two variables in our previous regressions 
that potentially control for this deficiency. The first is Equity market openness and the second 
Closely held firms. We further deal with the automatic impact of home bias and potential 
investability problem by constructing a freely floated home bias measure using the 
S&P/IFC’s freely investable market capitalisation variable instead of the S&P/IFC’s global 
market capitalisation used to construct our benchmark index.  
 
As investors deviate from holding the world market portfolio, following Fidora et al. (2007) 
we construct the following bilateral home bias ( ) to control for the impact of home 
bias on foreign equity allocation: 
 
 
where  is bilateral home bias observed by investor country i for country j at time t, 
and Mjt is as defined earlier but constructed using the S&P/IFC’s freely investable market 
capitalisation instead of the S&P/IFC’s global market capitalisation. However, a caveat is 
worth noting here. The S&P/IFC’s freely investable market capitalisation is only available 
for emerging markets; therefore, for the developed markets we assume that the entire market 
value is freely available to foreign investors, which may not be true. Nonetheless, we believe 
the addition of the Closely held firms variable captures the deficiency, if any. We run the 
following specification (10) using the freely floated (FA_Hbias) home bias variable, 
excluding the benchmark index. We present the output in Table 4 (column 6). 
 
 
 
As expected, the  is highly statistically significant. All our variables of interest, i.e. 
, are highly statistically significant with expected signs. 
 
 
 
  (9)  
  (10)  
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3.4 Indirect exposures 
We next resolve the effect of investors having indirect exposure to foreign equities in major 
financial centres. Our dataset on international equity portfolio investments includes direct 
purchase in the domestic markets and investment in global shares and depository receipts. 
Solnik and McLeavey (2004) note that big and internationally active companies issue/list 
their stocks on multiple and major stock exchanges, such as London, New York or Tokyo, for 
greater investor base, broader visibility, higher liquidity, and to avoid stringent and costly 
home regulatory stipulation. If this is the case, market-specific development and stability 
features may not matter to foreign investors, as they can have exposure to foreign stocks in 
their own major financial centres. To overcome the potential problem of major financial 
centres, we run the following specification (11) but exclude the U.S., the U.K. and Japan as 
investor countries. 
 
 
As shown in Table 4 (column 7), even after removing the investors from the major financial 
centres, the coefficients of  factors, except for the local market volatility variable, 
i.e. size, trading cost and liquidity, are still statistically significant, supporting the view that 
country-specific capital market features play a prominent role in foreign equity portfolio 
allocation decisions. 
 
3.5  Endogeneity  
Endogeneity may be a potential problem for our results. Errunza (2001) notes that the growth 
in foreign equity portfolio investment may itself trigger reform measures towards greater 
development of local capital markets. In the sample used, it is likely that our estimates may 
suffer from the endogeneity problem arising from reverse causality. To resolve the reverse 
causality problem we first generate a fitted variable using specification (5) but only including 
the most consistently most robust variables, i.e. Stock market size, Transaction costs and 
Market liquidity, and we refer to it as Development proxy.
8
 Following Gelos and Wei (2005), 
                                           
8
 Alternatively, we also use a common factor generated using principal component analysis, but the statistical 
results are similar as the common factor has a correlation of 0.92 with the Development proxy. 
  (11)  
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we use one-year lag value of the Development proxy and run the following specification 
(12).
9
 
 
 
 
As reported in Table 5 below, Development proxy, which is the fitted value of Stock market 
size, Transaction costs and Market Liquidity, is highly statistically significant.
10
 This 
confirms that our results do not suffer from reverse causality. 
 
………......Insert Table 5 about here.............. 
 
3.6 Cross-country heterogeneity and impact of the 2007-08 financial crisis 
As noted earlier, the estimated coefficients show an average predictive relationship between 
the variables. However, given our dataset is at country level, it is highly probable that the size 
of the estimates may vary across countries. To demonstrate this point, we select the Indian 
and the United States country dummies (arbitrary selection) and interact them with our 
Development proxy. We call these interactive variables Development_India and 
Development_USA respectively.  
 
Similarly, since our dataset includes the 2007-08 financial crisis period, the question to be 
asked is: do the statistical and economic relationships between development proxy and 
foreign equity portfolio allocation hold during the 2007-08 financial crisis? Here we make an 
attempt to answer this question by including time interactive variables. We interact the three 
time dummies, i.e. Pre-crisis time dummy_2002_2006, Crisis period time dummy_2007_2008 
and Post-crisis dummy_2009, with our Development proxy and refer to them as 
Development_2002_2006, Development_2007_2008 and Development_2009 variables. We 
run the following specification (13).  
 
                                           
9
 We also use one-year lag values of the individual CSEMCs, and find all of the measures, except local equity 
market volatility, to be statistically significant at 5% significance level. We do not report the results but these 
can be obtained from the authors on request. 
10
 The development proxy and most of the variables are also statistically significant at the conventional 5% 
significance level when we run the first difference estimation. 
 (12)  
 (13)  
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We report the results in Table 6 below. As seen, all the interactive variables are statistically 
significant. The sizes of the estimates for Development_India, 1.408
11
 (1.491-0.0830) and for 
Development_USA, 1.033
12
 (1.491-0.458) are different. Clearly, our analysis shows that if 
market development factors improve equally for India and the United States, foreign 
investors are, on a relative basis, willing to allocate proportionally more in the Indian equity 
market. This should not be surprising because, as shown in Table 2 (column 2), the home bias 
for India is greater (2.07) than the United States (1.33). Hence, following the prescription of 
the ICAPM, any identical improvement in the stock market development factor should reduce 
the Indian home bias correspondingly more than the home bias observed for the United 
States.  
 
Clearly, the above differential analysis demonstrates that each country may have an 
asymmetric effect on foreign equity portfolio allocations to changes in their stock market 
development factors, depending on the level of home bias observed by foreign investors and 
possibly on other market characteristics which may influence home bias, particularly bilateral 
familiarity factors. 
 
In terms of the impact of the 2007-08 financial crisis on the relationship between 
Development proxy and country allocation, all the time interactive variables are statistically 
significant. However, in terms of their economic impact on the average relationship, they are 
different. The relatively smaller differential coefficient of -0.111 for the 
Development_2002_2006 factor, with the average size of 1.38
13
 (1.491-0.111), demonstrates 
that during the pre-crisis period (2001-2006), the size of the average parameter was relatively 
stable. However, during the crisis period of 2007-2008, the average size reduced from 1.491 
to 0.734
14
 (1.491-0.757). Clearly, the deep and far-reaching global financial crisis of 2007-
2008 had a systematic effect in almost every country around the world, particularly those that 
are financially integrated with the global economy. This suggests that the differential 
coefficient of -0.757 for the Development_2007_2008 factor, though material, is not 
unexpected. However, even during the crisis period, we see the relationship between market 
development and country allocation still holds, as indicated by the statistically significant 
coefficient of 0.734 (1.491-0.757) with the linear combination test statistic of 15.13. 
                                           
11
 The linear combination test statistic is 32.18. 
12
 The linear combination test statistic is 21.04. 
13
 The linear combination test statistic is 31.10. 
14
 The linear combination test statistic is 15.13. 
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The size of the Development_2009 variable, i.e. -0.567, which is smaller than the crisis 
period factor size of -0.757, indicates that when the global financial markets began to 
stabilise, the predictive relationship between market development and country allocation 
seems to be gradually reverting to its average. 
 
………......Insert Table 6 about here.............. 
 
3.7 Relative importance of each CSEMC measure 
What is the relative importance of each of the  factors? We demonstrate the 
incremental contribution of each of the factors in explaining variation in foreign equity 
portfolio allocation using the R
2
 metric. We run five different specifications, beginning with 
Stock market size only in the first regression, and increasing the variable numbers by adding 
each of the  factors subsequently. It is worth noting that the R
2
 metric may not 
produce reliable results if the sample size varies substantially across the regressions. As 
shown in Table 6 below, the only difference in sample size observed is between the first 
regression and the remaining four regressions. However, the difference is less than 10% and 
therefore should not materially affect our result. 
 
The outputs across all the year-wise regressions clearly show that two most important 
variables is the size of the stock market and transaction costs. The statistical significance of 
the Stock market size with an R
2
 of 20% again indicates that investors are more inclined to 
invest in more visible, more industrially diversified and more developed capital markets. 
 
………......Insert Table 7 about here.............. 
 
The second but almost equally important variable is Transaction costs, with an additional 
Goodness of fit contribution of 21%. The significance of transaction costs again confirms the 
claim that foreign investors may shy away from markets with significantly higher trading 
costs. Market liquidity adds a further 13%, but the volatility measures do not show signs of 
any further addition. The statistical significance of market development variables, except for 
the volatility measures, clearly suggests that foreign investors favour investing in bigger, 
highly visible and more liquid stock markets. 
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3.8 Foreign equity portfolio holdings, allocations and 2007-08 financial crisis 
In almost all of the regressions discussed above, we observe that the Crisis period time 
dummy_2007_2008 is not only statistically significant but bears the expected sign and is 
much bigger than the Pre-crisis time dummy_2002_2006 and the Post crisis period time 
dummy_2009. Given the severity of the global financial crisis, this is expected. To evaluate 
the impact of the crisis on foreign equity portfolio holdings and the allocation of individual 
host countries in our sample, we produce the average holdings figures in Table 8 and the 
average allocation figures in Table 9 below. 
 
As shown, the total of the average holdings for all our sample countries for the year 2006 
were USD 540 billion and for 2007 were USD 626 billion. However, during the 2008 peak 
financial crisis year, this figure dropped to USD 346 billion.  
 
………......Insert Table 8 about here.............. 
 
………......Insert Table 9 about here.............. 
 
If we observe the changes in the value of holdings (column 6 and 7) over time, it is evident 
that although the crisis began in the summer of 2007, the real impact was felt in the year 
2008, particularly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In fact, for almost all the host 
countries, 2007 (column 3) saw elevation in the foreign equity portfolio holdings compared to 
the average of 2006. However, in the year 2008 (column 4), and as reported in column 6, all 
the host countries lost significant value of their shares relative to the year 2007. Given the 
nature of widespread, globally systematic and the deep impact of the 2007-08 financial crisis 
on world equity markets, it is not surprising that most of the developed host countries lost 
relatively more of their foreign equity holdings compared to the emerging host countries. 
However, as the markets began to stabilise in 2009, it was again the developed markets which 
recouped relatively much greater shares of their losses, as seen by the increase in their 
holdings for the year 2009 (column 5) and their differences over the year 2008 (column 7). 
 
If we conduct similar analyses for the changes in allocation over the four-year period, as 
reported in Table 9, although for most of the host countries the allocation decreases in the 
year 2008, with the exception of the United States, on average the cross-section of average 
allocation is relatively stable over the four-year period. This signifies that although the 
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valuation of the holdings has changed over time, the global country allocations of the foreign 
investors seem to be fairly steady in our sample. 
 
3.9 Control variables 
Not all the controls have the expected sign and statistical significance and are able to stand 
the robustness tests across the wide range of specifications. If we follow the efficient random 
effect model, the most important and generally consistent across the extensive spectrum of 
estimations are the familiarity variables. The significance of bilateral trade measure in all 
specifications is an indication that investors regard the problem of information asymmetry as 
a potential barrier when investing in foreign securities (see Portes and Rey, 2005; Chan et al., 
2005; Fidora et al., 2007). Similarly, investors tend to invest more of their wealth in countries 
nearer to them than farther from them, as reflected by the significance of the distance 
variable. The significance of common language across all specifications also shows that 
investors are more prepared to invest in countries sharing a common language, as this 
mitigates the information asymmetry problem to some extent (see Chan et al., 2005; Fidora et 
al., 2007). 
 
The issue of investor protection is debatable in the literature, with mixed conclusions reported 
by a number of existing studies (Aggarwal et al., 2005 and Chan et al., 2005). Aggarwal et al. 
(2005), using U.S. data, find that U.S. investors are inclined to allocate more funds to 
countries with better investor protection rights in place. However, Chan et al. (2005), using 
data on 26 countries (emerging and developed), show that investors are influenced more by 
stock market development and bilateral familiarity issues, and investor protection does not 
play any significant role in their investment decisions. In fact, their study finds that the 
investor protection measures carry an unexpected sign, similar to what our results reveal for 
the World Bank’s Investor protection measure, particularly for the cross-section estimations. 
Bekaert et al. (2007) conjecture that foreign investors may be more concerned about those 
aspects of regulatory environment that directly affect foreign investments, such as 
repatriation risk, exchange control risk, etc. It could be that the legal dummy captures 
investor protection effects specifically related to foreign investment, as most of the countries 
following English common law have relatively higher levels of investor protection rights for 
foreign investors. However, the issue needs further investigation. The capital control 
measures (Equity market openness and Closely held firms) are generally consistent and carry 
the expected sign, indicating that despite motivation to invest, investors may face legal 
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restrictions imposed by host countries. Though the economic development measure (GDP per 
capita) also seems to be generally consistent, we do not find the economic growth (GDP 
growth) and Historical returns measures to be significant and consistent in terms of predicted 
signs across different specifications. Similar results are also reported by other studies (see 
Gelos and Wei, 2005; Chan et al., 2005). 
 
 4. Conclusion 
Foreign equity portfolio investment is a vital channel through which countries attract 
overseas investment. Foreign equity portfolio investors play a pivotal role in the development 
of local (host) equity markets, which in turn drives the domestic economic development. 
Given the importance of foreign equity portfolio investment, it is imperative for policymakers 
to appreciate factors influencing the country allocation decision of foreign investors. 
Following the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM), a host country should 
receive their share of foreign equity portfolio investments, i.e. the proportion of their local 
market capitalisation in the world market portfolio. However, despite the conjectural 
prescription, foreign investors do not exploit investment opportunities offered by world 
market capitalisation. Relative to the suggestion of ICAPM, why do foreign investors not 
hold the world market portfolio, and what role do country-specific equity market 
characteristics play in the country allocations of foreign investors? 
 
This study presents a comprehensive and thorough assessment of the impact of country-
specific equity market characteristics on the allocation decisions of foreign equity portfolio 
investors. Although each individual host country may demonstrate an asymmetric effect, on 
average we show that stock market development factors, particularly, size, trading cost and 
market liquidity (market efficiency), play important roles in explaining a significant 
proportion of the cross-sectional and time variation in foreign equity portfolio allocations. 
Our results confirm that foreign equity portfolio investors prefer to invest more of their 
wealth in larger, more liquid and more efficient markets with lower trading costs. This 
assertion also holds when taking account of the recent 2007-08 financial crisis. The robust 
findings of our study imply that by improving the preconditions necessary for well-
functioning capital markets, policymakers should be able to attract higher levels of foreign 
equity portfolio investments.  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of key variables 
Country 
Portfolio 
allocation (%) 
Stock 
market size 
(% of GDP) 
Transaction 
costs (BPS per 
average 
transaction in 
USD) 
Market 
liquidity 
(%) 
Local 
equity 
market 
volatility 
(%) 
Exchange 
rate 
volatility 
(%) 
Argentina 0.04 41.49 68.30 10.68 44.27 12.45 
Australia 1.63 112.77 31.31 83.62 15.76 7.64 
Austria 0.55 30.13 30.50 69.81 24.74 1.80 
Belgium 1.06 67.35 28.22 38.98 29.15 2.30 
Brazil 0.79 53.46 43.06 46.18 42.81 14.06 
Canada 1.91 112.12 30.41 76.23 18.91 5.69 
Chile 0.04 106.99 66.63 15.07 21.41 7.39 
China 0.69 66.86 46.67 116.52 31.80 6.46 
Czech Republic 0.09 26.61 51.70 65.00 30.07 5.10 
Denmark 0.57 61.97 32.06 82.55 24.57 2.24 
Finland 2.05 104.11 37.66 121.25 25.31 2.75 
France 11.29 80.79 24.76 96.02 19.25 2.38 
Germany 9.37 45.76 25.60 140.68 23.73 3.19 
Greece 0.34 48.62 54.66 44.54 21.71 4.03 
Hungary 0.18 24.71 51.29 76.30 24.00 5.97 
India 0.50 66.07 59.07 121.26 30.03 4.78 
Indonesia 0.74 27.75 65.35 53.41 29.76 11.92 
Italy 3.35 40.08 29.18 125.56 20.72 2.49 
Japan 7.61 78.51 19.34 111.56 19.28 7.23 
Korea 1.16 72.50 55.16 235.45 19.60 6.03 
Malaysia 0.16 140.49 51.27 31.86 13.57 3.35 
Mexico 0.43 27.99 35.73 27.86 21.97 6.90 
New Zealand 0.16 38.37 34.65 51.72 16.68 7.22 
Norway 0.69 55.61 30.24 117.43 26.52 5.32 
Peru 0.02 44.01 70.82 7.25 28.08 3.90 
Philippines 0.05 47.15 88.23 17.63 24.14 5.61 
Poland 0.21 27.41 39.07 37.16 36.35 7.68 
Portugal 0.53 40.84 31.76 62.46 17.54 1.97 
Russia 0.79 60.64 31.05 55.59 25.10 13.04 
Sweden 1.94 103.77 28.64 125.25 28.77 4.38 
Switzerland 5.50 239.93 27.13 102.38 15.03 3.66 
Taiwan 0.65 84.61 51.20 178.57 16.88 4.39 
Thailand 0.19 59.28 53.37 96.20 29.51 3.81 
Turkey 0.24 32.83 51.12 73.61 43.13 14.97 
United Kingdom 14.98 129.84 50.02 146.71 15.45 4.36 
United States 36.25 125.51 21.73 195.36 18.04 4.02 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics of control variables 
Country 
Home 
bias 
GDP Per 
Capita (in 
USD) 
GDP 
Growth 
(%) 
Equity 
market 
openness 
(0-1) 
Closely 
Held Firm 
(%) 
Log 
Bilateral 
Trade 
Log 
distance 
Common 
Language 
Return 
(%) 
Investor 
protection 
(0-100) 
English 
common law 
dummy 
Argentina 2.34     7,479.47  3.95 0.67 52.68 7.27 8.90 0.00 22.64 30.20 0 
Australia 1.58   29,546.95  3.08 1.00 24.85 8.38 9.08 0.33 17.49 95.18 1 
Austria 0.58   32,140.75  1.36 1.00 54.85 8.68 6.93 0.14 21.13 95.73 0 
Belgium 0.92   30,423.49  1.33 1.00 47.14 9.66 6.69 0.34 25.67 89.56 0 
Brazil 1.29     5,207.14  3.11 0.79 67.13 8.34 8.69 0.00 30.03 50.41 0 
Canada 2.11   30,673.48  1.77 1.00 48.82 8.86 8.21 0.54 14.18 94.69 1 
Chile 2.96     6,863.07  3.52 0.73 64.94 7.38 8.89 0.00 20.26 89.39 0 
China 2.25     1,909.66  10.12 0.42 68.74 9.80 8.43 0.00 14.83 42.32 0 
Czech Republic 0.74   10,185.78  3.26 0.79 78.10 8.24 6.77 0.00 34.26 77.65 0 
Denmark 1.03   39,892.49  0.65 1.00 25.10 8.75 6.86 0.33 15.76 98.21 0 
Finland 0.02   32,748.32  1.81 1.00 23.00 8.56 7.32 0.06 6.74 97.75 0 
France 0.45   29,463.45  1.11 1.00 38.00 10.08 6.97 0.20 8.51 87.23 0 
Germany 0.32   29,685.63  0.54 1.00 45.00 10.70 6.73 0.20 9.63 93.14 0 
Greece 1.32   19,738.74  3.41 1.00 75.00 7.79 7.46 0.00 6.70 74.68 0 
Hungary 0.44     8,236.56  2.31 0.92 49.48 8.10 7.06 0.00 23.14 80.07 0 
India 2.07       729.01  7.54 0.50 40.32 8.36 8.44 0.37 26.99 50.30 1 
Indonesia 1.33     1,313.77  5.11 0.72 68.97 7.84 8.79 0.00 28.91 30.30 0 
Italy 0.65   25,155.57  0.03 1.00 38.00 9.82 7.17 0.05 7.64 72.64 0 
Japan 1.43   37,770.97  0.50 1.00 38.00 9.55 8.62 0.00 5.63 85.71 0 
Korea 1.27   14,741.10  3.93 0.87 39.23 8.86 8.44 0.37 24.47 73.23 0 
Malaysia 1.73     5,215.52  4.14 0.75 52.15 8.26 8.72 0.00 12.45 65.41 1 
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Mexico 1.54     7,121.63  1.29 0.84 26.15 8.17 8.53 0.00 24.47 51.76 0 
New Zealand 1.87   19,672.13  2.29 1.00 77.00 7.14 9.15 0.39 17.04 96.77 1 
Norway 0.93   54,671.32  1.85 1.00 41.00 8.76 7.10 0.00 20.59 94.08 0 
Peru 2.44     2,887.32  5.27 0.67 68.60 6.46 8.75 0.00 33.05 43.95 0 
Philippines 1.82     1,283.09  4.40 0.47 51.13 7.40 8.68 0.36 9.65 44.88 0 
Poland 1.12     7,355.22  3.87 0.80 64.26 8.46 7.06 0.00 16.98 67.72 0 
Portugal 0.97   14,925.42  0.54 1.00 35.00 8.06 7.40 0.00 1.83 84.13 0 
Russia 1.44     4,653.04  4.83 0.63 0.00 8.80 8.16 0.00 46.45 27.46 0 
Sweden 0.74   35,707.03  1.48 1.00 21.00 9.17 7.13 0.00 10.69 95.68 0 
Switzerland 0.37   43,729.69  1.34 1.00 26.00 9.11 6.83 0.40 12.10 96.34 0 
Taiwan 1.75   15,137.29  2.91 0.74 22.26 #N/A 9.06 0.00 7.50 77.60 0 
Thailand 1.15     2,819.51  3.98 0.51 57.83 8.15 8.61 0.34 22.48 58.56 1 
Turkey 1.22     5,042.78  3.16 0.76 70.86 8.41 7.70 0.00 29.02 55.94 0 
United Kingdom 0.44   31,329.40  1.47 1.00 10.00 10.24 6.91 0.33 7.60 95.48 1 
United States 1.33   39,490.76  1.58 1.00 8.00 10.54 8.44 0.33 5.84 92.66 1 
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Table 3 
Correlation between different measures of country-specific equity market characteristics 
  
Stock 
market 
size 
Transaction 
costs 
Market 
liquidity 
Local equity 
market 
volatility 
Exchange 
rate 
volatility 
      
Stock market size 1.00     
Transaction costs -0.21 1.00    
Market liquidity 0.27 -0.31 1.00   
Local equity market volatility -0.16 0.17 -0.14 1.00  
Exchange rate volatility -0.23 0.29 -0.21 0.31 1.00 
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Table 4 
Regressions out of different specifications 
 CSEMC With home bias as 
control 
All controls and 
time dummies 
All controls and fixed 
effect estimation 
Controlling for 
free float 
Controlling for major 
financial centers 
Stock market size 0.513*** 0.620*** 0.603*** 0.542*** 0.599*** 0.587*** 
 (12.00) (23.62) (23.09) (12.91) (22.79) (20.27) 
       
Transaction costs -0.455*** -0.362*** -0.282*** -0.178* -0.280*** -0.296*** 
 (-7.23) (-7.70) (-4.14) (-1.73) (-4.12) (-3.94) 
       
Market liquidity 0.330*** 0.290*** 0.267*** 0.154*** 0.268*** 0.267*** 
 (6.71) (9.96) (7.10) (4.83) (7.10) (6.42) 
       
Local equity market volatility -0.108* -0.132*** -0.0508* -0.0739 -0.0537** -0.0453 
 (-1.84) (-4.07) (-1.86) (-1.42) (-1.97) (-1.48) 
       
Exchange rate volatility -0.103 -0.283*** -0.209*** -0.289*** -0.197*** -0.216*** 
 (-1.38) (-5.70) (-3.88) (-9.73) (-3.68) (-3.61) 
       
Home bias  -0.744*** -0.753*** -0.749*** -0.751*** -0.773*** 
  (-37.80) (-43.23) (-17.56) (-42.95) (-42.82) 
       
GDP per capita   0.444*** 0.542*** 0.444*** 0.453*** 
   (5.38) (5.26) (5.39) (4.97) 
       
GDP growth   0.921** 1.233 0.992** 0.860* 
   (2.29) (1.41) (2.40) (1.91) 
       
Equity market openness   0.608** 0.906* 0.599** 0.587** 
   (2.51) (1.77) (2.41) (2.22) 
       
Closely held firms   -2.449*** NA -2.459*** -2.442*** 
   (-10.52)  (-10.58) (-9.42) 
       
Bilateral trade   1.075*** 0.757*** 1.071*** 1.195*** 
   (6.81) (9.67) (6.78) (6.87) 
       
Distance   -0.294*** NA -0.299*** -0.242*** 
   (-6.94)  (-7.07) (-5.07) 
       
Common language   0.498*** NA 0.501*** 0.579*** 
   (4.46)  (4.51) (4.63) 
       
Historical return   -0.266*** -0.135** -0.259*** -0.268*** 
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   (-6.06) (-2.52) (-5.89) (-5.49) 
       
Investor protection   -0.0365 0.565*** -0.0514 -0.0107 
   (-0.25) (3.64) (-0.35) (-0.07) 
       
English common law dummy   0.254** NA 0.258** 0.208* 
   (2.36)  (2.40) (1.76) 
       
Pre-crisis time dummy_2002_2006   0.0319* 0.0861*** 0.0352* 0.0252 
   (1.79) (4.32) (1.96) (1.27) 
       
Crisis period time dummy_2007_2008   -0.182*** -0.0616 -0.179*** -0.264*** 
   (-3.07) (-0.93) (-3.00) (-4.08) 
       
Post-crisis time dummy_2009   -0.0774 0.0985*** -0.0696 -0.161** 
   (-1.09) (3.19) (-0.98) (-2.04) 
       
Overall R2 0.54 0.67 0.79 0.74(FE) 0.79 0.80 
Number of observations 4616 4478 4478 4478 4478 3618 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithmic equity portfolio allocation (weights) from country i into country j for time t. The independent variables are 
country-specific equity market characteristics,  (Stock market size, transaction costs, market liquidity, local equity market volatility and exchange rate 
volatility). The controls and time dummies include Home bias, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, Equity market openness, Closely held firms, Bilateral trade, 
Distance, Common language, Historical return, Political risk (investor protection), English common law dummy and the three time dummies. The sample size 
and inclusion of controls varies across different specifications. Except fixed effect (column 5), all estimations are based on random effect model. The first 
specification does not include any control (column 2). The second includes home bias as the only control (column 3), while the third includes home bias and all 
other controls, including time dummies (column 4). The fourth specification includes all time variant controls, including time dummies, but uses fixed effect 
estimation (column 5). The fifth specification also includes all controls and time dummies but uses the free float home bias (column 6). Finally, the sixth 
specification includes all controls and time dummies but excludes the major financial centres’ countries (U.S. U.K. and Japan) from the sample (column 7). In all 
the random effect estimations, the test statistics are made robust allowing for clusters in each cross-sectional unit. Furthermore, the fixed effect model uses 
Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) standard errors for correcting cross-sectional dependence. For tractable interpretation all the coefficients are reported as elasticity 
and the statistical significance is reported at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) significance levels. 
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Table 5 
Reverse causality 
 All controls and lagged development proxy 
Development proxy 0.934*** 
 (18.76) 
  
Home bias -0.706*** 
 (-34.54) 
  
GDP per capita 0.0899* 
 (1.71) 
  
GDP growth 3.090*** 
 (4.91) 
  
Equity market openness 0.440 
 (1.61) 
  
Closely held firms -3.122*** 
 (-15.70) 
  
Bilateral trade 1.158*** 
 (7.39) 
  
Distance -0.372*** 
 (-8.86) 
  
Common language 0.547*** 
 (5.08) 
  
Historical return 0.351*** 
 (4.72) 
  
Investor protection 0.308*** 
 (2.87) 
  
English common law dummy 0.275** 
 (2.55) 
  
Pre-crisis time dummy_2003_2006 -0.184*** 
 (-7.85) 
  
Crisis period time dummy_2007_2008 -0.481*** 
 (-11.81) 
  
Post-crisis time dummy_2009 0.106* 
 (1.94) 
  
Overall R2 0.79 
Number of observations 3874 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithmic equity portfolio allocation (weights) from country i into country j for time t. 
The independent variable is one year lagged Development proxy (fitted value of Stock market size, transaction costs, and 
market liquidity). The controls and time dummies include Home bias, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, Equity market 
openness, Closely held firms, Bilateral trade, Distance, Common language, Historical return, Political risk (investor 
protection), English common law dummy and the three time dummies. The test statistics of random effect estimation are 
made robust allowing for clusters in each cross-sectional unit. For tractable interpretation all the coefficients are reported as 
elasticity and the statistical significance is reported at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) significance levels. 
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Table 6 
Parameter stability 
 Parameter heterogeneity across countries (India and 
USA) and time 
Development proxy 1.491*** 
 (35.69) 
  
Development_India -0.0830*** 
 (-3.19) 
  
Development_USA -0.458*** 
 (-17.11) 
  
Development_2002_2006 -0.111*** 
 (-5.60) 
  
Development_2007_2008 -0.757*** 
 (-17.22) 
  
Development_2009 -0.567*** 
 (-10.11) 
  
Home bias -0.805*** 
 (-47.97) 
  
GDP per capita 0.467*** 
 (8.27) 
  
GDP growth 1.411*** 
 (4.38) 
  
Equity market openness 0.955*** 
 (4.52) 
  
Closely held firms -2.041*** 
 (-10.36) 
  
Bilateral trade 0.156 
 (1.03) 
  
Distance -0.440*** 
 (-10.59) 
  
Common language 0.608*** 
 (6.36) 
  
Historical return -0.251*** 
 (-6.63) 
  
Investor protection -0.323*** 
 (-3.12) 
  
English common law dummy 0.173 
 (1.56) 
  
Pre-crisis time dummy_2002_2006 -0.653*** 
 (-6.12) 
  
Crisis period time dummy_2007_2008 -4.190*** 
 (-19.25) 
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Post-crisis time dummy_2009 -3.116*** 
 (-11.11) 
  
Overall R
2
 0.81 
Number of observations 4478 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithmic equity portfolio allocation (weights) from country i into country 
j for time t. The key independent variables of interest include Development proxy (fitted value of Stock market 
size, transaction costs and market liquidity), the two country interactive variables (Development _India and 
Development_USA), which are Indian and USA dummy variables interacted with Development proxy, and the 
three time interactive variables (Development_2002_2006, Development_2007_2008 and Development_2009), 
which are 2002_2006, 2007_2008 and 2009 time dummies interacted with Development proxy. The controls 
and time dummies include Home bias, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, Equity market openness, Closely held 
firms, Bilateral trade, Distance, Common language, Historical return, Political risk (investor protection), English 
common law dummy and the three time dummies. The test statistics of random effect estimation are made robust 
allowing for clusters in each cross-sectional unit. For tractable interpretation all the coefficients are reported as 
elasticity and the statistical significance is reported at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) significance levels. 
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Table 7 
Relative importance of each CSEMC measure 
 1st  
regression 
2nd  
regression 
3rd  
regression 
4th  
regression 
5th  
regression 
Stock market size 0.599*** 0.492*** 0.524*** 0.524*** 0.513*** 
 (15.19) (12.52) (13.21) (13.26) (12.00) 
      
Transaction costs  -0.625*** -0.468*** -0.458*** -0.455*** 
  (-8.88) (-7.36) (-7.29) (-7.23) 
      
Market liquidity   0.346*** 0.338*** 0.330*** 
   (6.63) (6.57) (6.71) 
      
Local equity market volatility    -0.128** -0.108* 
    (-2.07) (-1.84) 
      
Exchange rate volatility     -0.103 
     (-1.38) 
Overall R
2
 0.20 0.41 0.54 0.54 0.54 
Number of observations 4895 4616 4616 4616 4616 
Note: The test statistics are made robust and for tractable interpretation the coefficients are reported as elasticity. 
The significance is reported at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) significance levels. All the variables used are 
explained in Table 4. 
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Table 8 
Changes in foreign equity portfolio holdings during 2007-2008 crisis period 
  Average foreign equity portfolio holdings (USD million) 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Difference 
(2008-2007) 
Difference 
(2009-2008) 
Argentina 196 250 93 116 -157 23 
Australia 13,021 17,010 8,715 16,003 -8,295 7,288 
Austria 3,419 4,093 1,609 2,243 -2,485 634 
Belgium 5,829 6,281 2,724 5,090 -3,556 2,366 
Brazil 8,016 14,940 6,710 15,615 -8,230 8,905 
Canada 24,956 31,088 15,595 26,343 -15,493 10,748 
Chile 436 513 404 774 -109 370 
China 7,475 12,401 6,778 10,936 -5,623 4,158 
Czech Republic 430 609 417 488 -193 71 
Denmark 3,217 4,391 2,439 3,359 -1,952 920 
Finland 7,721 12,198 6,003 5,977 -6,195 -26 
France 45,819 54,639 31,308 40,581 -23,331 9,273 
Germany 37,800 51,814 26,492 34,346 -25,322 7,854 
Greece 2,530 4,253 1,350 1,481 -2,903 130 
Hungary 967 964 382 556 -582 174 
India 4,439 9,049 4,197 6,278 -4,852 2,082 
Indonesia 11,231 1,629 759 1,575 -870 816 
Italy 17,824 20,450 9,485 12,404 -10,965 2,918 
Japan 65,675 61,905 38,713 43,576 -23,192 4,863 
Korea 11,303 14,213 6,006 10,174 -8,208 4,169 
Malaysia 1,261 2,004 887 1,394 -1,117 507 
Mexico 6,524 7,068 3,831 5,129 -3,237 1,298 
New Zealand 661 681 366 581 -315 215 
Norway 4,741 6,481 2,417 3,710 -4,064 1,293 
Peru 142 193 151 237 -42 85 
Philippines 585 970 432 570 -537 138 
Poland 888 1,371 663 983 -708 320 
Portugal 1,193 4,395 3,976 3,978 -419 2 
Russia 5,539 9,012 2,877 5,557 -6,135 2,680 
Sweden 9,168 9,459 4,492 6,878 -4,968 2,386 
Switzerland 32,154 37,941 24,891 34,496 -13,049 9,604 
Taiwan 7,685 8,547 4,544 8,259 -4,003 3,716 
Thailand 1,462 2,047 967 1,637 -1,080 670 
Turkey 1,557 2,425 1,129 2,106 -1,296 977 
United Kingdom 81,542 87,256 47,896 68,811 -39,360 20,916 
United States 113,385 123,277 76,166 105,559 -47,111 29,392 
Source: CPIS-IMF (descriptive calculated by authors) 
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Table 9 
Changes in foreign equity portfolio allocations during 2007-2008 crisis period 
  Average foreign equity portfolio country allocation (%) 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Difference 
(2008-2007) 
Difference 
(2009-2008) 
Argentina 0.021 0.031 0.018 0.024 -0.013 0.006 
Australia 1.688 1.924 1.764 2.202 -0.160 0.438 
Austria 0.798 0.858 0.711 0.664 -0.147 -0.047 
Belgium 1.175 1.205 0.808 1.036 -0.397 0.228 
Brazil 0.769 1.271 1.000 1.632 -0.270 0.631 
Canada 2.026 2.193 2.149 2.607 -0.044 0.458 
Chile 0.043 0.040 0.055 0.077 0.016 0.021 
China 0.901 1.257 1.234 1.425 -0.023 0.191 
Czech Republic 0.105 0.112 0.120 0.091 0.008 -0.029 
Denmark 0.635 0.604 0.590 0.579 -0.015 -0.011 
Finland 1.661 2.177 2.016 1.684 -0.161 -0.333 
France 11.113 11.579 12.388 12.811 0.809 0.424 
Germany 9.254 10.862 10.454 10.046 -0.408 -0.409 
Greece 0.546 0.721 0.406 0.315 -0.315 -0.090 
Hungary 0.209 0.182 0.127 0.126 -0.055 0.000 
India 0.518 0.971 0.815 0.878 -0.156 0.063 
Indonesia 1.175 0.170 0.132 0.227 -0.037 0.094 
Italy 3.577 3.646 3.086 2.876 -0.560 -0.210 
Japan 8.816 7.432 7.351 6.092 -0.081 -1.259 
Korea 1.225 1.453 1.221 1.398 -0.232 0.177 
Malaysia 0.156 0.216 0.182 0.209 -0.034 0.026 
Mexico 0.461 0.466 0.444 0.452 -0.022 0.008 
New Zealand 0.138 0.172 0.163 0.186 -0.008 0.022 
Norway 0.917 1.074 0.823 0.946 -0.251 0.123 
Peru 0.025 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.003 0.002 
Philippines 0.070 0.081 0.060 0.069 -0.020 0.009 
Poland 0.213 0.285 0.259 0.297 -0.026 0.038 
Portugal 0.221 0.817 1.366 0.947 0.549 -0.419 
Russia 1.295 1.537 0.894 1.236 -0.643 0.342 
Sweden 2.076 1.822 1.479 1.645 -0.343 0.166 
Switzerland 5.177 5.432 6.186 5.853 0.754 -0.332 
Taiwan 0.734 0.744 0.676 0.958 -0.068 0.281 
Thailand 0.181 0.225 0.195 0.244 -0.030 0.049 
Turkey 0.352 0.421 0.273 0.327 -0.148 0.054 
United Kingdom 14.362 13.736 13.552 13.132 -0.184 -0.420 
United States 33.637 32.427 34.395 32.875 1.969 -1.521 
Source: CPIS-IMF (allocation constructed by authors) 
 
